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Introduction 
Suicide terrorism is a serious and complex form of warfare that has been 
increasing in use among what Western media portray as non-state or state-
sponsored terrorist organizations. We have witnessed a large upsurge in the 
number, scope, and frequency of bombing attacks worldwide over the past few 
decades (Moghadam, 2008). The number of suicide attempts and the number of 
suicide agents (especially women, even in patriarchal societies) escalated 
dramatically in Africa after the Arab Spring. Nigeria, along with Somalia and Mali 
are the most dangerous areas in North Africa today. On February 11, 2016, in 
northeastern Nigeria, two female suicide bombers blew themselves up in a refugee 
camp, killing at least 58 people and wounding 78 (Associated Press, 2016). 
Suicide bombing attacks are particularly dangerous not only because of 
their potential to inflict mass casualties, but also since they are so difficult to 
prevent and to predict. Former Indian counter-terrorist chief Bahukutumbi Raman 
(2003, 2004) has argued that suicide bombers are able to infiltrate both soft and 
secure targets at will with good success.  Audrey Cornin, a Professor of Public 
Policy at George Mason University, (2003) offers several reasons for suicide 
attacks; they spawn high casualties, as well as create publicity (notoriety) for the 
attackers and their cause.  “The nature of attack strikes fear into an enemy,” Cornin 
argues, “and the attacks are effective against superior forces and weapons.” By their 
ability to pick and choose their target when it will cause the most damage, suicide 
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bombers give terrorist groups maximal control over their attacks.   At the same 
time, the attacks “stimulate religious and ideological fervor,” intensifying its threat 
to society (Ganor, 2001).  Even the least effective attack can impact and erode 
public morale. Suicide bombings can result in not only physical damage to 
individuals, but also “severe psychological damage.”  They can spread terror among 
a broad civilian population (Goodwin, 2006). 
What makes someone become a suicide terrorist?  By “suicide” it is meant 
the perpetrator causes their own death in the process of killing or maiming others, 
and “terrorism” can be defined as an extreme form of violence and force designed 
to intimidate and to destroy human lives around the world. In the United States, 
explanations have centered on the three broad themes: 1) poverty; 2) lack of 
education; and 3) mental illness.  The Bush Administration believed that “high 
levels of unemployment” empower terrorist organizations to recruit and argued that 
anti-poverty programs in terrorism-prone regions would reduce the incidence of 
suicide terrorism (Pastor, 2004).  However, numerous studies have shown that 
suicide terrorists are not mentally imbalanced, and they are probably no less 
educated and poorer than the general population. In his study of Palestinian 
terrorists, Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari (2004, 2010) found no difference in the 
“distribution of socioeconomic or educational factors” among the Palestinian 
people.  In their working paper on “Hard Targets” (2005), economist Eli Bermin 
and political scientist David Laitin have shown how difficult it would be for 
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terrorists to recruit “an impoverished young man who knows nothing about the 
ideals of the organization to volunteer for certain death.” Is there a psychological 
profile that characterizes suicide terrorists?  Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist 
Joseph Leyveld has claimed (2001) that suicide bombers have no fundamental 
psychopathology.  Can we understand the mind of a suicide terrorist?  What 
motivates them? This paper examines the phenomenon of suicide bombing and 
advocates a sociological context for understanding them. 
 
History 
Suicide terrorism is not new.  Historically, suicide terrorism can be traced 
to the early Jewish Zealots and their struggle against their Roman conquerors in 
Biblical times. Also, Shia assassins in the 11th-13th century used suicide terrorism 
against their Sunni majority factions in early days of Islam. Their bold murders of 
their rivals often in public places invited instant death to the attackers.  
The first suicide bombings of the 20th century involved Japanese kamikaze 
pilots who attacked American planes, ships and military personnel in the Pacific 
beginning in late 1944.  Unlike contemporary suicide bombers, the pilots attacked 
only military targets. Moreover, pilots were motivated by a desire to die for their 
country, and they did not exhibit any signs of “clinically abnormal behavior” 
(Maxwell and Ryan, 1988). 
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 The first large suicide bombing after World War II occurred on 23 October 
1983, when a truck laden with explosives rammed into a building serving as a 
barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American military personnel and 
wounding another 128 servicemen.  Minutes later, another truck bomber struck the 
French barracks and some 58 paratroopers were killed and 15 were injured. Six 
Lebanese civilians including children were also killed in the two blasts, not to 
mention the drivers themselves.  A group calling itself “Islamic Jihad,” a front 
group for Hezbollah (Party of God), backed by Iran and Syria, claimed 
responsibility for the attacks.  These suicide truck bombings showed how shocking 
and destructive such attacks could be.  Months later, the United States and France 
withdrew their peacekeepers from Beirut, as demanded by the terrorists.  
Afterwards, Hezbollah launched a series of nearly two dozen suicide attacks 
directed at the Israeli and Lebanese armies in the 1980s.  Palestinian non-state 
groups, such as Hamas, influenced by Hezbollah’s truck bombings in Lebanon in 
the early 1980s, used the same tactical methods against Israeli targets. One reason 
why suicide bombings were adopted is because they were so successful. 
In northern Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began 
using suicide attacks involving concealed explosive belts and vests in late 1980s. 
Unlike Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups, the LTTE was a secular Marxist 
group of Hindu nationalists dedicated to creating an independent Tamil state in Sri 
Lanka. The Black Tigers and Tigresses, an elite fighting wing of LTTE, is believed 
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to have been responsible for more suicide attacks than any other terrorist group in 
history (BBC News, May 2, 2000). 
Recently, suicide terrorism has moved from being an insurgency tactic 
employed in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Chechnya and Israel to becoming a means to 
achieve a global jihad (holy war).  Formed in Pakistan in the late 1980s, Al-Qaeda 
has employed numerous suicide bombings against civilian and military targets, 
including the September 11 attacks. Other specific groups such as Boko Haram and 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have used suicide attacks throughout the 
world, including the bombing in London in 2005, which killed 52 people and in 
Bali in 2002, when 202 people were killed.  ISIS has carried out atrocious acts of 
violence in Syria and Iraq over the last several years. 
Although existing for centuries, suicide terrorism became a more popular 
phenomenon after the 1980s. Between 1983 and 2015, nearly five thousand terrorist 
incidents occurred in nearly 50 countries, resulting in the deaths of more than 
45,000 people.  Suicide attacks account for a relatively small percentage of these 
incidents, but they are responsible for more deaths due to terrorism. The rate of all 
attacks has increased from an estimated three per year in the 1980s to roughly one 
per day today. Most of those deaths have occurred in Iraq, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan, though thousands of other lives have been lost in Syria, Nigeria, 
Yemen, Somalia, Russia, and Israel. And as recent events in France, Belgium and 
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the United States have shown, suicide terrorism will continue to be a major security 
risk for the imaginable future.  
Competing Frameworks  
 Efficacy and ideology are two prominent frameworks that have been put 
forth to explain what kinds of groups and personalities adopt suicide terrorism as a 
tactic and why they do so. The efficacy framework holds that adoption of suicide 
tactics results from the tactic’s utility to accomplish a goal. Proponents of the 
efficacy argument claim that the resort to this particular tactic is primarily driven 
by a group’s strategic requirements (Hoffman, 2006). Some proponents of this view 
also contend that suicide attacks are particularly effective against states that are 
hard to target (Berman & Laitin, 2005). Robert Pape (2005) argues that suicide 
terrorism is particularly effective against democracies because democratic states 
are beholden to their constituents and must justify their policies to their audience. 
Such states are therefore more sensitive to the civilian casualties that suicide 
bombings tend to inflict.   
 The ideological framework indeed is a multifaceted one and outlines the 
roles of belief systems in creating motivation to carry out suicide attacks as well as 
cultivating support for these attacks among a group’s target audience. The religious 
ideology approach characterizes religion as a medium through which an individual 
or group legitimizes self-sacrifice with promises of supernatural rewards (Hoffman, 
2008).  
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 An additional view of the ideological framework downplays and in many 
cases denies the influence of religion, pointing to an emergence of nationalistic 
ideology during an occupation of foreign powers. Pape (2005) argues that 
resentment of a foreign power creates a high degree of commitment within the 
community and therefore helps to justify certain tactics that require the sacrifice of 
a community member.  
Many studies and works have been published that challenge the claims of 
the efficacy and ideology frameworks that attempt to explain this complicated 
issue. Piazza (2008) and Wade and Reiter (2007) have pointed out that several 
groups such as the Spanish ETA or Northern Irish IRA faced strong and democratic 
states but did not resort to suicide tactics (as cited in Braun and Genkin, 2014). 
Domenico Tosini, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Trento in 
Italy, argues that the causal link between suicide and religion has been disproved, 
given that several secular terrorist groups such as the Tamil Tigers have used 
suicide bombing (2009). Tosini admits that “religious rhetoric” may be a tool for 
recruitment, and Islamic tradition may be used to justify suicide as martyrdom, but 
it does not explain fully why individuals choose suicide attacks.  
 Braun and Genkin (2014) argue that elements of all frameworks hold some 
truth and emphasize the importance of highlighting deeper, underlying cultural 
dimensions that influence the “diffusion process” of the adoption of suicide 
terrorism. They stress that the adoption of suicide terrorism by an organization, as 
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with any practice, must mesh with a society’s values and attitudes in which that 
organization is operating. “The practice has to be culturally resonant because 
deeper cultural forces constitute actors and determine the costs of strategies” (Braun 
and Genkin, 2014). The rest of this paper will therefore focus on societal 
collectivism and individualism as aspects of cultural resonance, an underlying 
dimension that helps explain why organizations adopt suicide terrorism tactics. 
Societal Collectivism versus Individualism 
Society in general shapes everybody from birth. It helps instill certain 
values in children that are reflective of the place and time in which they live. 
Because of this tie between society and the individual, the society must play an 
important part in the employment of suicide terrorism. Community and cultural 
resonance play key roles in the establishment and legitimization of suicide 
campaigns; if suicide attacks do not make sense in the context of the society and 
culture that carry them out, then they would not be as popular as they are with 
terrorist organizations today. One of the key questions to ask when discussing how 
a terrorist organization or any other organization wishing to reach some political 
end adopts suicide terrorism as a tactic is: How and why do suicide attacks make 
sense?  
 Due to the fact that society and culture do have such a heavy influence on 
people’s values, it is important to examine certain aspects of the society from which 
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suicide attackers originate in order to address this act that baffles many, especially 
Westerners. While there are several characteristics that distinguish one culture from 
another, probably one of the biggest and most prevalent is the conflict between the 
individual and the group. Individualist societies value the individual more than the 
group, and collectivist societies value the power and importance of the group over 
the individual. In collectivist societies, group membership is usually not chosen but 
rather is given. The family is usually the first group that provides children with their 
identity, which then develops over time to include the entire society, creating a deep 
sense of loyalty from a young age (Davis, 2009). In these cultures, individual 
opinions and interests are not valued as highly as the opinions and interests of the 
group as a whole as the group is elevated as the primary actor. The power of this 
collectivist mentality lies in stark contrast to the individualist mentality in which 
group loyalty is not as stressed.  
One of the most prominent social scientists and scholars on differences in 
cultural mentality, Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede, conducted a study 
that measured individualism on a scale and explained the significance of living in 
a collective society. Hofstede found that “Loyalty in a collectivist culture is 
paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations . . . . Everyone 
takes responsibility for fellow members of their group. In collectivist societies 
offence leads to shame and loss of face” (The Hofstede Centre, 2006).    
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  With these key differences in mind, suicide attacks can be analyzed through 
the lens of collectivism versus individualism. To help show the correlation between 
an increased likelihood of carrying out suicide attacks and collectivist societies, one 
can examine empirical studies on individualism versus collectivism conducted by 
the Hofstede Centre, which was founded in Helsinki, Finland, in 2012. In their 
work, Hofstede Centre researchers assign an individualism score to each country 
from which it collects data, which is obtained through various mediums (surveys, 
cultural observations, opinion polls); any country that receives a score lower than 
50 on a scale from 1 through 100 is considered to be collectivist. When reviewing 
this data, one can clearly see a relationship between collectivism and suicide 
terrorism. In fact, “terrorist organizations that originated in countries with a 
collectivist culture are responsible for nearly 98 percent (2,149 of 2,202) of all 
suicide attacks from December 1981 through December 2006” (Davis, 2009).  
There is evidence that collectivism endorses various kinds of “sacrifice” for the 
group. Agreement with such statements as “People in a group should be willing to 
make sacrifices for the sake of the group’s well-being” strongly correlates with high 
scores on collectivism.  (Wagner, 1995). 
To make this point more tangible, Saudi Arabia can be used as an example. 
Historically, Saudi Arabia has been and still is in many ways a tribal culture, which 
is largely collectivist in nature. The Hofstede Centre has assigned Saudi Arabia an 
individualist score of 25; meaning if it were to receive a collectivist score, it would 
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receive a score of 75. When studying the nationalities of attackers in Al-Qaeda, one 
can see that the overwhelming majority of them originated from Saudi Arabia. This 
is even more apparent when examining the nationalities of the 19 attackers behind 
September 11, of whom 15 were from Saudi Arabia (September 11th Hijackers, 
2014). In Saudi Arabia’s case, there appears to be a theoretical link, as “collectivism 
correlates strongly with the adoption of suicide terrorism” (Braun and Genkin, 
2014). 
  Probably one of the biggest factors behind the reason members of 
collectivist societies employ suicide attacks is a feeling of altruism and self-
sacrifice. In these societies, “individuals who kill themselves rather than allow harm 
to members of their community gain social prestige and receive encouragement” 
(Pape, 2005). Several scholars have noted that one thing modern suicide terrorists 
have in common is they believe they are “sacrificing their lives” for a greater good 
(Padahzur and Perliger, 2003; Pape, 2003, 2005). Although some dismiss suicide 
terrorists as psychologically unstable, uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated 
and frustrated adolescent males, data suggests that not one of these 
characterizations is completely true (Howard, 2004).  Pape, an American political 
scientist at the University of Chicago, known for his work on the rationale of suicide 
terrorism (2003, 2005), analyses all suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001. He 
argues that the attackers are so dissimilar that “it may not be possible to find a single 
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profile.” Bruce Hoffman (2003) agrees that “there is no clear profile anymore—not 
for terrorists and especially not for suicide bombers.” 
As members of collectivist societies, they are conditioned from birth to 
believe that the group is more important than the individual, and it would be 
expected that many would view their own lives to be less important and worthy of 
continuing than the lives of the majority. This fundamental world view resonates 
throughout the community as a whole, and the decision to sacrifice oneself for the 
group is therefore made more palatable. This in effect greatly reduces or eliminates 
the cost of organizations utilizing suicide tactics, as societal backlash would be 
much less intense in collectivist societies. Further bolstering the importance on the 
group, suicide terrorists commonly carry out their attacks in squads. The prevalence 
of attacks carried out by groups indicates a sort of altruistic motive. These attackers 
“achieve a collective purpose, [and carry out] a group mission that serves a cause 
beyond their own personal death” (Pape, 2005).  As Dominic Tosini (2009) argues, 
suicide bombers have a deep attachment to idealized representations of their 
communities.  When altruism enters the equation, Tosini assesses that it produces 
a culture of martyrdom. Similarly, Braun and Genkin conducted a preliminary 
analysis by looking at data collected by the Pew Global Attitude Project. From 2002 
to 2010, Pew asked Muslim respondents in twenty-five countries whether suicide 
attacks against civilians were justified. The project correlated the country 
collectivism scores with percentage of the population that supported suicide 
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missions.  The result: collectivist countries approved of suicide missions 
significantly more than individualist ones (Braun and Genkin, 2014). Further 
studies conducted by Braun and Genkin determined that out of 414 terrorist 
organizations studied, slightly more than 25 percent of the organizations that scored 
high on the collectivist scale had adopted suicide tactics, while only about 6 percent 
of those that scored low on the collectivist scale had. Such empirical studies 
indicate that collectivist groups are indeed more likely to adopt suicide terrorism.  
 At this point, one hole in the argument of a correlation between suicide 
terrorism and collectivism can be identified. It is clear from the data supplied by 
The Hofstede Centre that many cultures which are collectivist have never employed 
suicide attacks. Many Latin American countries, for example, are scored even 
higher on the collectivist scale than Arab countries like Saudi Arabia. Yet there 
exists no records of suicide terrorism in these countries. Because of this, it is 
important to note that collectivism alone cannot explain suicide terrorism. But it 
does seem to be an essential factor or precondition if not predictor of suicide 
terrorism. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that Arab countries have higher 
incidents of suicide attacks solely because they are collectivist societies. Rather, we 
should view collectivism as being an essential and underlying contributing factor. 
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Applying Societal Collectivism 
The main question remains: What motivates members of collectivist 
societies to make the use of suicide terrorism seem logical or rational? At this point, 
the previously mentioned nationalistic ideological framework can be examined 
through the lens of societal collectivism. Because collectivist societies are strongly 
loyal to each other and look out for the safety of one another, some type of threat 
to the group’s safety and way of life must be the reason why members of these 
societies resort to such extreme measures. According to Robert Pape: “Nearly all 
suicide terrorist attacks have in common [one] specific secular and strategic goal: 
to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the 
terrorists consider to be their homeland” (Pape, 2005). As he theorizes, a feeling of 
nationalism and protectionism of the group contributes to pushing individuals over 
the edge and adopting the open use of suicide terrorism.  
 In Pape’s study, the examination of the variety of terrorist organizations 
which employ suicide attacks indicates that the fight for self-determination, not 
religion, is the common thread between all of these groups.  In fact, one of the most 
infamous terrorist organizations of all time is the LTTE, whose platform is to 
establish a state for the ethnic Tamil population that resides in the Sinhala-
dominated government of Sri Lanka, which declared that Buddhism would be the 
national religion and Sinhala the national language, completely marginalizing the 
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Tamils. The feeling of nationalism is so strong in the LTTE that it has actually 
carried out “more suicide attacks than any other groups,” (Pape, 2005).  
 Such an example of a terrorist organization does not fit into the narrow 
modern view of terrorists that many people in the West hold. Stereotypically, 
suicide attackers are conservative Muslims with detonators in their hands and 
explosive devices strapped to their chests with the sole purpose of doing Allah’s 
work guiding their actions. Examination of other terrorist organizations, such as the 
Tamil Black Tigers and Tigresses who have no religious affiliation, begins to render 
the stereotypical view of a suicide terrorist untenable. Further undermining this 
viewpoint is reading and listening to manifestos and statements made by major 
figures in these different terrorist organizations. Their words often reveal a much 
deeper and very different driving factor behind the actions of the organizations. 
Rather than speaking exclusively about religion or other ideologies, what mainly 
comes through in their words is the desire to regain independence from an 
occupying or other oppressive force that threatens the lives of the community. A 
classic example of this desire is shown in Hezbollah’s February 16, 1985, “Open 
Letter” in which the organization publicized its grievances and goals. The following 
excerpt establishes clearly Hezbollah’s desire to rid its homeland of foreign 
intervention and regain its right of self-determination: 
America [and its allies] . . . [have] attacked us and continue to do so 
without respite. Their aim is to make us eat dust continually. This is why 
we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel 
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aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity. They 
invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, 
violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people …. 
(Council on Foreign Relations). 
 
The foreign power or occupation, the U.S. in this instance, creates a clear 
“in” and “out” group. The language used in the letter reflects a deep sense of 
wanting to protect the interests of the “in” group. The “out” group has in this case 
cemented and strengthened the collectivist attitude of the group that is perceiving 
itself to be under attack. While some religious language gives credence to the 
religious ideological framework, the overwhelming majority of the language 
revolves around a common threat facing the community. Such language is not 
limited to Hezbollah, but rather is extremely common among terrorist 
organizations.  
While many terrorist organizations in modern times do share similar 
religious beliefs to Hezbollah, principally Islamic ones, it is not Islam itself that 
drives people to wear explosive vests or belts or place bombs in vehicles which 
they guide into buildings. Studying the timeline of suicide attacks in predominantly 
Islamic countries helps to demonstrate this point. Iraq, for example, has an 
incredibly long history with Islam. In fact, Baghdad was one of the most influential 
cities in the Islamic Empire. Interestingly, suicide terrorism in Iraq did not exist 
until 2003, which is the year the United States and coalition forces invaded the 
country. The numbers decreased once the United States began to withdraw troops. 
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However, they spiked once again with the creation of the modern Islamic State 
(ISIS), which views the Sunni populations of Iraq and Syria to be unfairly governed 
and repressed by the Shi’a governments in the two countries. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the attacks on Shi’as “are primarily motivated by a belief that Shi’a 
political and religious groups welcomed and cooperated with the U.S. invasion to 
overthrow the Iraqi government, which was long dominated by Sunni Arabs” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005). This in a sense is a type of occupation and oppression 
that the Islamic State purports to combat, which it does so in part by carrying out 
suicide attacks through exploiting collectivist attitudes of an audience that would 
go very far to defend the community against a perceived threat.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite public perceptions influenced by modern media coverage in the 
West, all suicide terrorist incidents in modern times have not been directly caused 
by religious fundamentalist groups, especially radical Islamist terror organizations.  
Although many possible causes of suicide terrorism have been discussed here, it is 
likely that no single reason — in fact, various causes interact — to motivate 
someone to become a suicide bomber. While religion or religious fanaticism may 
play a role, it is not the predominant precondition. Individual psychology, 
psychological abnormality, or personal feelings of desperation or hopelessness do 
not appear to have played any significant role either. Poverty and a lack of 
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education have minimal to no scientific support. Revenge against foreign occupiers 
and nationalist ideology alone also do not sufficiently explain the dilemma of 
suicide terrorism. However, identification with the group and community and a 
motivation to sacrifice oneself for “the cause” seem to be major contributing 
factors. The majority of suicide attacks which have occurred since 2003 have been 
conducted by Muslims because Islamic lands have suffered the most from foreign 
intervention, and Muslim societies tend to be traditional-collectivist in mindset. 
Therefore, a combination of many different factors, which in many cases includes 
a high level of societal collectivism as an underlying cultural precondition, may 
explain why so many suicide attacks have been carried out by Muslims in countries 
such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It is imperative to understand these underlying 
factors and motivations in order to create a policy that will effectively address the 
issue and not simply perpetuate the same patterns that the world has witnessed since 
the early 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol9/iss1/4
References 
Associated Press (2016), 2 female bombers kill 58 in northeast Nigeria refugee 
camp.  Online:  
http://www.yahoo.com/news/2-female-bombers-kill-56-northeast-nigeria-
refugee-183111685.html. 
BBC News (May 2000), Tamil Tigers: A Fearsome Force. Online:  
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/526407.stm 
Berman Eli and David D. Laitin. (2005). Theory and Evidence on Suicide 
Attacks. National Bureau of Economic Research. Online: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11740.pdf 
Braun, Robert and Michael Genkin. Cultural Resonance and the Diffusion of 
Suicide Bombings: The Role of Collectivism. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 
58 (7): 1258-84. 
Collard-Wexler, Simon; Pischedda, Constantino; and Michael G. Smith. (2014). 
Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks? Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
Vol. 58 (4): 625-57. 
Council on Foreign Relations. (1988). An open letter: The Hizballah program. 
Retrieved from 
 http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-
hizballah-program/p30967        
19
Momayezi and Momayezi: Suicide Terrorism: Motivations beyond Religion
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2017
Cronin, A. K. (2003). Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict. CRS Report for Congress.  
Online: http://www.fas.oeg/irp/crs/RS21529.pdf 
Davis, R. D. (2009). Community value above individualism: A common cultural 
element in modern suicide bombers. Air Command and Staff College, 
Montgomery, Alabama.  
Goodwin, Jeff. (2006). A theory of categorical terrorism. Social Forces. Vol. 84: 
2027-46. 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2003). The Logic of Suicide Terrorism. The Atlantic Monthly. 
Vol. 291: 1-11. 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Human Rights Watch (2005). A Face and Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent 
Groups in Iraq. Vol. 17, no. 9. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/Iraq1005/   
Leyveld, J. (October 28, 2001). All suicide bombers are not alike.  The New York 
Times. 
Maxwell, Taylor and Helen Ryan.  (1988). Fanaticism, Political Suicide and 
Terrorism. Terrorism. Vol. 11, No. 2.   
Merari, A. (2001). Peer pressure spurs terrorists, psychologists say.  Retrieved 
from  
 http://www.psychminded.co.uk/news/news2001/1001/10terror.html 
Moghadam, Assaf. (2008). The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi 
20
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol9/iss1/4
Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.  
Pape, Robert A. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. 
New York, NY: Random House.  
Pastor, L.H. (2004).  Countering the psychological consequences of suicide 
terrorism. Psychiatric Annals. Vol. 34 (9): 701-7. 
Pedahzur, A. ; A. Perliger; and L. Weinberg. (2003). Altruism and Fatalism: The 
Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists. Deviant Behavior. Vol. 24 (4): 
405-23. 
Post, Jerrold M. et al. (2009). The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism. Psychiatry. 
72 (1): 13-31. 
Raman, B. (2002), Islamic Terrorism in India: The Hydra-Headed Monster. South 
Asia Analysis Group.  Online: http://www.saag.org/papers6/papers526.html 
Raman, B. (March, 3, 2004). Massacres of Shias in Iraq and Pakistan-the 
Background. South Asia Analysis Group. Online: 
http://www.saag.org/papers10/papers941.html 
September 11th hijackers fast facts. (2014, September 8). Retrieved from 
 http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-hijackers-fast-facts/  
The Hofstede Center. 2006. National culture. Retrieved from   
http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html    
21
Momayezi and Momayezi: Suicide Terrorism: Motivations beyond Religion
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2017
Tosini, D.  (2009). A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attack. Theory, 
Culture, Society. Vol. 26 (4): 67-96. 
Tanaka, Y. (July 2005). Japan’s Kamikaze Pilots and Contemporary Suicide 
Bombers: War and Terror. Asia-Pacific Journal. Vol. 3, Issue 7. 
 
22
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol9/iss1/4
